THE NEW REPUBLIC

Auden and Isherwood

by Stephen Spender

Repudiation in 1958

William Costello on Nixon

Love Does It Again

by Robert Brustein

The Steel Injunction

by Louis H. Pollak

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Another Economy Binge?

★ This is one of those interesting moments where Washington is hotly debating something the rest of the country won't begin talking about for three to six months. It looks as though the Eisenhower Administration is hell-bent for another of its big economy binges, panicked by "loss of gold" and fearful of "devaluation of the dollar." In a violent reaction, the Administration has already tied a protectionist "Buy American" clause to the Development Loan Fund, may do the same thing for the International Cooperation Administration, is planning to slash foreign aid and may save money by pulling back a military division or two from overseas.

These are the kind of actions that balance the budget and endanger the nation. MIT economist-pundit W. W. Rostow summed it up for the Congressional Joint Economic Committee last week: The Soviet won't wage major war, he said, "unless we tempt it beyond endurance by our weakness during the period of the missile gap." The Administration's economy retrenchments fill some observers with genuine horror. Rostow, for example, listing "four of our worst mistakes in modern history," attributes each to "a fear that our democracy could not deal with the problems faced without losing its essence." Hoover believed we couldn't deal with the great depression without destroying capitalism. Isolationists believed we couldn't deal with Hitler without losing some attribute of Americanism. Truman's Louis Johnson thought our society couldn't afford a military budget of over $15 billion. And now today, Professor Rostow adds the fourth "worst mistake" – "the similar belief of the present Administration that its overriding mission has been to reduce the public budget it inherited, despite the accelerated challenge it has faced since 1953 in many dimensions."

In every case but the latest ("where the bill is still to be reckoned"), Rostow adds, the ultimate threat to democracy was greater than if the challenge had been accepted in the first place.

CIA head Allen Dulles had something to say on this before the Joint Economic Committee, November 13. People looked at him curiously. The explosive growth of the Central Intelligence Agency would have been unthinkable a few years ago. It is the great super-spy agency that is more mysteriously glamorous (if that is possible) than the FBI. Few know its budget, few the number of employees: we only know that Eisenhower laid the cornerstone of a new building this month and that it is going to be – hold your breath! – nearly half the size of the gigantic Pentagon. All this in a free society for an agency only 12 years old.

Money, Money Tekel

★ We thought Dulles' testimony tremendously significant but so cryptic (in this case sugar-coated) that few heeded. It has been so since "mene, mene tekel upharsin." With all the authority and background of CIA, Dulles warned that the Soviet economy, whether measured by simple industrial output or the more comprehensive Gross National Product, is increasing twice as fast as ours. And it is so allocated – by what George Kennan has called "a purposeful, serious and disciplined society" – that although the Soviet economy is still only 45 percent of ours, its military effort is about *equal* to ours.

That is what Rostow meant when he said "unless we tempt it beyond endurance by our weakness." Allen Dulles, naturally, had to be tactful. The gap, he warned, is being "dangerously narrowed" by the Soviets. "We must increase our rate of growth," he said, "which has been less than 3 percent (actually 2.5 percent) over the last six or seven years." But he didn't spell out who was President in the last "six or seven years." He didn't explain what the restrictive policies were that brought two sickening recessions one after the other. Well, people didn't understand the warning at Belshazzar's feast, either . . . they probably just went back to enjoying the Babylonian equivalent of rigged television quiz shows.

Nelson Rockefeller grabbed this same "growth issue" in his speech before the New York Economic Club; he mentioned the word "growth" 29 times in one talk, before starting on his West Coast trip. This column still rather suspects that Rocky will nudge out Dick in the Chicago convention. It will all depend on how scared Republicans are of the Democratic candidate. Never underestimate the power of a fresh attractive face in American politics – when backed by a billion dollars. The Rockefeller family is the richest in the country. When the right time comes they will know who influences whom. Even on this California trip the pro-Nixon *Los Angeles Times* reported that a polite letter came to West Coast corporation heads from David Rockefeller, vice chairman of the Chase National Bank of New York (deposits – $7.386 billion). He urged kind treatment for his brother Nelson.

We suspect Nixon is going to use this wealth issue, if the going really gets tough. He will be aided by a posthumous memorandum, soon to be published, of Robert A. Taft, blaming his own defeat by Eisenhower in the 1952 convention to newspaper hostility and to "Eastern financial interests."

The big handicap to the House investigation of "influence" on the federal regulatory commissions is that a lot of the influence comes from Congressmen. Yet every time the Oren Harris committee digs in it brings up a sensation. Now Senator John Carroll (D, Colo.) starts a Senate probe in the same field. And columnists Robert Allen and Paul Scott report an independent investigation by Cabinet members William Rogers and Arthur Flemming for the Administration.

The Party's Voice

★ When Paul Butler created the Democratic Advisory Council Senator Byrd denounced it as "ill-advised." Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn wouldn't join. But Senators Humphrey and Kefauver did join and, last week, so did Senators Kennedy and Symington. More than ever it is the party's national voice as against the conservative Congressional voice.

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13. The Washington Post

Recalling the innocuous generalities in the speeches of Governor Franklin Roosevelt in 1931, one hesitates to ask too much from Governor Rockefeller now. He is a pleasanter choice for the Presidency than his only Republican rival. But Mr. Rockefeller is tugged in two directions: if he boldly criticizes Republican errors, the Party Regulars will like him even less; if he moves the other way and unqualifiedly blesses the Administration's record, how independent and responsible will he seem to the Irregulars? So far, he has edged away from the White House line only by recommending a resumption of underground nuclear tests, and by leaving the impression of doubt about the value of negotiating at this time with the Soviets. If chill winds blow on the mountain tops next spring, Mr. Rockefeller can then remind us that he never thought mountaineering was the best way to spend one's time.

But foreign affairs will not be the only issue in 1960. There will be soft spots in the economy, such as a further decline in farm income, which the Democrats will not leave unexposed or unexploited. The Rockefeller appeal will be tested, therefore, not only by where he stands *vis-à-vis* the Russians, but where he stands *vis-à-vis* the Americans. And for this reason, the Governor's speech last week to the Economic Club of New York merits analysis.

It began with an account of the Governor's achievements in promoting economic growth within his state. He confided the fairly appalling statistic that "some 40 task force studies" are under way. He sensibly doubted that the present, high Soviet growth rate can be maintained in the face of labor shortages and increasing internal demands for more consumer goods. Moreover, he said, there is no reason why our rate of growth cannot exceed 3 percent (the long-run trend) or the postwar average of 4 percent. (It should be observed that the 3 and 4 percent figures refer to increase in total national output, not in per man production.) But how are we to expand to the higher rate? On the critical question, Mr. Rockefeller said nothing to upset his audience of businessmen. We cannot accelerate rapidly, he said firmly, by relying on government intervention: "Under our enterprise system, an increased rate of growth cannot be achieved by government fiat, or by any magic formula. . . . One sure way to interfere with our historic and present potential for growth would be to pursue the 'purchasing power for prosperity' line of government spending, inflation, and taxes that repress investment. But if we strive for growth along sound, free enterprise lines, we can reap substantial benefits in strengthening our

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national defense, strengthening our capacity for international economic cooperation and competition, strengthening our free institutions, and meeting our human responsibilities at home."

What "sound, free enterprise lines" should be followed in order to achieve the growth rate Governor Rockefeller wants? He answers with a 6-point program, beginning with "further encouragement of research, innovation and education." He does not say who shall do the encouraging, the government, private sources or both, or by what mechanisms. Point 2 advocates "monetary and fiscal policies to moderate recessions and contain inflation." No one will quarrel with that, but Mr. Rockefeller's emphasis here is on action by the several states, rather than action by the federal government or the Federal Reserve Board whose actions count most if we are talking about monetary and fiscal policy.

Point 3 suggests that labor refrain from seeking further reductions in the length of the work week. Yet unless we have in mind total mobilization, there is every reason to believe that needed expansion can occur without reversing the trend toward a shorter work week. For example, the steel industry last year produced at only about 60 percent of capacity, and this under-employment would not have been remedied had the work week been longer. Mr. Rockefeller ignores too the fact that the best relief industrial society has been able to offer people who undergo the monotony of its mechanical service is the enlargement of the time available for life away from the factory or office. Nor is this proposal entirely consistent with the Governor's later concern with the impact of automation. It should be obvious that one way to cushion the disruption caused by the second Industrial Revolution of automation is to continue the historical tendency toward reduced hours. It is interesting that Mr. Rockefeller backed away from this point under questioning later by reporters.

The recommendations on taxes in Point 4 are carefully vague. The full text reads: "We need tax revision to encourage savings and investment, initiative and enterprise. Such revision should give more realistic treatment to depreciation and reduce the present burden on productive investment. This does not mean changing the progressive nature of our tax system, but tailoring the progression to our needs for investment." It seems fair to infer from this that the Governor favors reduction in the top income tax rates. But although there are many economists who also favor reduction in the highest incremental rates (the top rate is now an unrealistic 91 percent), they carefully couple their recommendation with detailed proposals for the closing of expense account, depletion, and capital gains loopholes. There is no sign of such coupling in Mr. Rockefeller's address.

A certain protective haze obscures the full meaning of the fifth point as well: "We need to remove the drags on our growth such as the ineffective phases of our farm program, government inefficiency and featherbedding – whether it be in labor or industry – through subsidies and certain tariff protections." Which portions of the farm program does he specifically mean? What would he substitute? What measures might be taken to eliminate "featherbedding"?

The final Point suffers from a distressing similarity to the Eisenhower style in public administration. Here is how Mr. Rockefeller phrases his concern about automation: "We need to face more realistically the problems that come with automation. They lie at the heart of growing labor-management tensions and their resolution is of importance not only to labor-management but to the future strength and competitive position of our nation." What should be done? "To help develop an agreed upon framework of objectives and relationships needed to deal with them, I recommend that there be established at the national level, a consultative body with representatives from labor, management, the public and the Secretaries of Labor, Commerce and Treasury." Another commission.

It's hard to do sums with purposely vague pronouncements. Yet it is a fair summary to say that the Governor's speech does not add up to any bold, new program for strengthening the American economy. This judgment is based on more than the free enterprise platitudes which stud the speech. The accent on states' rights, the suggestion of tax amendments to help the wealthy, the prudent retreat into obscurity at key points, the idea that increasing productivity requires a longer working week, the skepticism about government participation in economic expansion and the shifting of resources from trivial private uses to public uses – all these suggest a backing away from the more positive positions taken only a year or so ago in the Rockefeller Report.

If Governor Rockefeller were to become President Rockefeller, we could reasonably expect less benighted Secretaries of Treasury than Messrs. Humphrey and Anderson, and a more farsighted view of government budgeting than these gentlemen have led Mr. Eisenhower to advocate. But we would expect that from Mr. Nixon too, for he is a professional politician and has never been as enamored as is his Chief of the businessman-turned-public-servant. Mr. Rockefeller's sincerity and charm are acknowledged, even in California. But he has yet to show what other reasons there are for preferring him to his opponent. Whether he is a more likely winner than Nixon is of primary interest to Republican professionals. Whether the country would be better off if he did beat Nixon is a question of public interest. On the evidence of the Economic Club speech, the Governor's "program" for growth is a poor substitute for the approach to the problems of a democratic, industrial nation competing with a dynamic Communist society taken by Senators Clark and Humphrey in the Congress or J. K. Galbraith and Leon Keyserling out of it.

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Mr. Dulles' Testimony

Allen W. Dulles, Director of the CIA, has performed an important public service by warning that America's present margin of economic superiority over the Soviet Union will be "dangerously narrowed unless our own industrial growth rate is substantially increased from the present pace." In his testimony as the first witness in hearings being held by the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics – headed by Rep. Richard Bolling – of the Joint Economic Committee, Dulles estimated that the Soviet Union will grow industrially by from 8 to 9 percent per year. He compared this to a possible growth rate of 4.5 percent per year for the United States and emerged with the conclusion that in this case the Russians would by 1970 attain 60 percent of American industrial output. If the American industrial growth rate is "the two percent which Khrushchev believes is the best we have in us," then by 1970 Soviet industrial output will reach more than 80 percent of ours.

But the most important point Mr. Dulles made was that neither gross national product nor total industrial production is a "true yardstick of our national power positions" and that it is the uses to which economic resources are directed that "largely determine the measure of national power." Thus, a very rich nation can, depending on how it uses its wealth, be a weaker nation as measured in terms of its national security capabilities than a less wealthy nation like the Soviet Union which uses its lesser wealth more wisely from the point of view of its security and survival.

One does not need to endow the CIA with mythical powers of omniscience to be able to say that in this particular area Allen Dulles is no doubt as well informed as any man in this country. The CIA does an excellent job in detecting the flaws and holes in official Soviet statistics, in deflating overweening Soviet claims when they are made, and in reporting current developments. Very much of this type of work can be done on the basis of official publications and open observation without dependence on clandestine material. If Dulles credits the Soviet Union with an industrial growth rate of from 8 percent to 9 percent, it must be assumed that this statement is well based.

It may also be said that even though the Dulles testimony was blunt, it probably tends considerably to understate the danger. One of the reasons for this is that, like many others who have ventured into the field, Mr. Dulles tended to take the optimum growth rate of American industry and gross product in the postwar era and to base a prediction on this. It is relevant to point out, for example, that when American postwar growth is cited in terms of a percentage per year, inspection will often show that the group of years from which the percentage is derived includes the Korean War boom which brought about the most rapid stimulation of total industrial output in a short period achieved since World War II. Certainly in the coming decade one cannot count on this kind of stimulation. Despite recovery from the recent recession, the American growth rate in the last few years has not been startling and economic development has been proceeding in fits and starts. Without considerable changes in orientation and national leadership it would, for example, seem highly risky to project an anticipated growth rate in American industrial output of 4.5 percent to 1970.

Also, though Mr. Dulles has been quite objective in presenting Soviet economic attainments and in deflating Soviet propaganda claims, he may still be underestimating Soviet economic capabilities. He failed to point out with complete clarity that the Soviet Union is in the midst of a quite extraordinary economic and industrial upsurge which sees very appreciable gains made each year. And there is not yet any real reason to foresee much slackening of this growth.

Americans are known as practical people, proud of being problem-solvers. But first the problem has to be identified. Congressman Bolling's Joint Economic subcommittee is helping to prepare the way for future progress by giving the public a fuller understanding of what the problem is.

Happy Birthday?

Today is somebody's birthday. Among others, it is the birthday of the 3,000 Americans who with the last stroke of midnight became 65 years old. That they reached this day (and a million of them do each year) is a tribute to modern medicine, sanitation, nutrition, to the food supply available in this country and to a standard of living which gave them the purchasing power to acquire their share of it; to an environment which gives new-born infants an average life expectancy of 71 years.

Sixteen million Americans are alive who have already had their 65th birthday. Two out of three of those who become 65 today will live to celebrate their 75th birthday; one out of four will be there when the 85-year mark rolls around. At the beginning of the century, only 3 million Americans had reached or passed the age of 65. In 10 years, more than 7 million will be 75 or older.

But the unhappy side to these birthdays is that American society has few ideas of what to do either with the aged and the aging or about them. Translated into real persons and their problems, the Madison-Avenue words, "senior citizens" and "golden years" mean low or no income, little suitable housing, much neglected ill-health, and, psychologically far more important even than these, few means of doing active and useful work for the hundreds of thousands whose employment has been in organizations with retirement policies that make no provision for the morning after the 65th birthday.

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The Steel Injunction

by Louis H. Pollak

If ever documentation were needed for the proposition that what's constitutional may not necessarily be wise, the search for authority is at an end. The decision of the Supreme Court sustaining the Taft-Hartley steel injunction proves the point.

So we're constitutional. But (as the cruise director is wont to ask) Is Everybody Happy? Fred Hartley, Jr., quondam junior partner in the firm of Taft-Hartley, is reported pleased: "I am glad the families of the steel workers will have a pay-check at Christmas rather than the prospect of singing 'solidarity' in the union hall." But the former Congressman would not seem to be in the majority. The President has not tried to conceal his doubts that government intervention would be conducive to settlement. Secretary Mitchell has been, if anything, even more bearish about the utility of the remedy involved. Even the steel companies, through R. Conrad Cooper, their top labor spokesman, have confessed that, "A court order, of course, is not the basis on which we had hoped work might be resumed." And it goes without saying that the leaders of the United Steel Workers, plus tens of thousands of rank-and-file union members, are deeply resentful even as they undertake to comply with the judiciary's back-to-work decree.

It was the conviction that the injunction would not expedite settlement of the strike which led Circuit Judge William H. Hastie to dissent, in the Court of Appeals, from his colleagues' affirmance of the injunction. As the Supreme Court was to read the Taft-Hartley Act 10 days later, whether the injunction would aid or hinder contract negotiations seems, rather curiously, to be irrelevant as a matter of law. But nobody has contended in any persuasive fashion that Judge Hastie's insight into the bargaining process was faulty.

It is true that both sides remain under a duty to bargain throughout the 80-day injunction. The President's Board of Inquiry, headed by Dr. George W. Taylor, will report after 60 days on the status of the negotiations. And within 15 days after the report – *i.e.*, no later than five days before the injunction expires – the Labor Board is charged with conducting a ballot among the strikers on the last management proposal. But the slim volume of Taft-Hartley precedent does not suggest that these mechanisms are likely to be productive: Of the 11 instances prior to the present steel and dock strikes in which Taft-Hartley injunctions have been issued, six have been settled during the 80-day period and five have not. This record suggests that a settlement is reached only if the situation is ripe for it. Here one is hard put to find encouraging signs, and discouraging ones abound.

The steel companies, in arguing their neolithic case for unilateral revision of work rules, have taken a high moral ground which cannot be swiftly compromised. And on the union side one may anticipate that, whatever the law's mandate of good faith bargaining may entail, David McDonald and his associates will now bargain with the most deliberate speed imaginable. They will do so because, in their anger at the Administration's intervention, they will do anything they can to avoid validating the efficacy of a Taft-Hartley injunction. And they will be supported in their slow-down by two superficially inconsistent factors: The first is that union members are now back at work, easing the economic pressure to settle. The second is the union's awareness that at the end of the 80-day period the Administration will be powerless to restrain resumption of the strike. The President will then – in late January – be forced to report the impasse to Congress. And a good many Congressmen are likely to view the issues sympathetically to the half-a-million voters on the picket lines. This Congressional reaction will clearly intensify the public pressure on the steel companies; and it might, conceivably, be translated into legislation which relaxes or provides alternatives to the injunctive pattern.

Of course it may continue to be felt – even by some in Congress – that Taft-Hartley injunctions have the limited virtue of restoring vital production for the time being. To take the present instance, the injunction should in a few weeks time generate a substantial flow of steel. But the flow will dwindle if January approaches with no settlement and the steel companies are forced once again to initiate the lengthy and expensive process of cooling the blast furnaces. By the time the current 80 days have elapsed, there should not be many in or out of Congress who will view the steel injunction as more than an exercise in futility.

Intervention by Government

To deduce from all this that government has no role to play in labor disputes of this character and magnitude would be to learn the wrong lesson. The issues which divide David McDonald and Roger Blough are matters of national economic policy whose resolution the nation cannot ignore even if it would. So the question to which

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devoted attention must be given in the coming weeks and months is not *whether* government intervention in major strikes is in order, but *what sort* of government intervention is appropriate.

The proper answer doubtless is many-headed, and should be expected to vary in accordance with such factors as the nature of the particular industry, the kinds of community hazards a strike poses, the numbers and distribution of workers involved, and the types of issues which are deadlocked. Fashioning governmental remedies which may be fairly responsive to many possible contingencies is going to be a very subtle job. But doing the job well calls for recognition of one lesson brought home sharply by the litigation surrounding the present injunction. The lesson is that courts are not very adept at handling this kind of problem. The requisite inquiries are too diffuse for the courtroom; and the time available for these inquiries is too short.

Not that the courts didn't give the steel case their all. In less than three weeks a federal trial court, a federal court of appeals and the Supreme Court considered and resolved the issues raised by the Attorney General's prayer for an injunction. But what were the issues? Principally (so one ultimately learns from the Supreme Court's opinion) whether the strike, if permitted to continue, would have posed a threat to "the national health or safety." Whether "national health" is a strictly physiological concept, or has economic radiations as well, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to determine. For "national safety" in an era of cold war is a rubric roomy enough to validate the present injunction or, one would suppose, most others that a reluctant President may seek in years to come.

The point is that the judiciary cannot seriously be expected to make an inquiry – based on affidavits, as here, or even on an examination of live witnesses – calculated to lead them to a genuinely independent appraisal of the "national health or safety." For courts to differ with the President on the amount of steel necessary for a particular missile program – let alone the necessity for such a program – is a manifest absurdity. Defending the United States is the non-delegable responsibility of the President and Congress, not of the courts. In this sense, the judicial inquiry presently contemplated by the Taft-Hartley Act seems not far removed from what the Supreme Court in other contexts regularly calls a "political" question reserved to the elective arms of government and hence immune from meaningful judicial scrutiny.

Possibly it could be otherwise. In cases arising under the Sherman Act, the federal courts for seventy years have inquired into commercial practices on the basis of standards the courts themselves have formulated. The courts were given carte blanche by Congress to fashion national economic policy, and they have done so.

But the one attribute which has characterized all the great antitrust cases has been the amount of judicial time devoted to their resolution. And time is the one thing which cannot be freely expended prior to the issuance of a labor injunction. The President can make defense policy in an hour, or a second. Courts cannot sensibly make any policy in this abrupt fashion.

Special Role of the Courts

The job of courts is not simply to decide; it is to adjudicate – to prefer one course to another, within the framework of relevant legislative and constitutional norms, and to articulate a comprehensive rationale explaining the choice. Haste is the enemy of adjudication. The Supreme Court has proved this many times – especially in the *Rosenberg* case; the *Quirin* case, involving the World War II saboteurs; the *Girard* case, which tested Japanese jurisdiction over an American Marine; and other like cases in which the pressure for prompt decision has eclipsed the merits of the issue. Some of these may have been rightly decided, but fortuitously rather than as the result of mature reflection upon draft after probing draft of majority and dissenting opinion.

The Supreme Court's utterance on the steel case is of a piece with these. It does not explain; it asserts. It is a press release, not an opinion. Nor is the lone dissent by Justice Douglas of much higher caliber, although it goes through the forms of analysis and argument. The analysis of the case which has the best chance of survival is the as yet unwritten concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. These two Justices have announced their agreement with the majority that the injunction was within the trial court's power to issue. But they have not yet had time to write out their views on the various questions presented. One may hope that Justice Frankfurter – the draftsman of the Norris-La Guardia Act, who knows more about the labor injunction and has thought more about the limits of judicial competence than any of his brethren – will, together with Justice Harlan, consider those crucial questions which escaped the attention of the other Justices and of the lower court judges who passed on the case: What did Congress in enacting Taft-Hartley contemplate as the respective roles of the President and the courts? Do the courts retain an independent function? If so, what is it and why is the inquiry it entails "judicial" within the constitutional definition of the power of federal judges? If the judicial determination is not independent of the President's, in what sense have we remained faithful to the separation of governmental powers required by the Constitution? And, finally, if we call upon judges to act without time for reflection, have we not abandoned the essence of the judicial function?

Whether judicial intervention in the steel strike of 1959 turns out to be any more useful than judicial intervention in the Pullman strike of 1892 will largely depend on what we learn from the current experience.

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A REPORT FROM SOVIET LATVIA

"Our Bridge to the Outside World"

by George Sherman

"Ah Riga – our Paris of the East," sighed a Russian girl as our airplane circled over the capital of Soviet Latvia. To the Russian, Riga is the West he can visit within his own borders. Its piercing church spires, rusticated stone façades, narrow cobblestone streets, and Latin alphabet come from another civilization. They exert all the fascination of the unknown. But to the Western eye, even Riga's newer buildings look sick with early old age. The "Old City" is a masterpiece of medieval and early renaissance architecture (Scandinavian or North German, not Parisian), but it is near collapse. What cafes do exist are thoroughly Soviet: heavy Victorian fittings, bad (as distinct from leisurely) service, and music which oppresses rather than relaxes. The new opera house is the inevitable provincial replica of the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow. It stands along a picturesque but stagnant canal which divides the city between "new" and "old."

Two peoples, almost equally divided, coexist in this city of 650,000. Most of the Russians were imported after 1944, when Latvia was absorbed by the Soviet Union. Many moved into fully furnished homes vacated by the millions of "bourgeoisie" who either fled westward with the retreating Germans or were deported eastward to Siberia by the on-coming Russians. Those who survived have been returned since Stalin's death but their occupied and ill-repaired homes, like their spirit, are lost. In the words of a Russian student at Riga University: "History stopped for the Latvian people in 1944. They want to remember only what was, not understand what is. They do not see that things are changing in the Soviet Union, because they do not look at the Soviet Union. But then they do not look at anything or anyone."

He had come to Riga with his parents but would leave as soon as he finished the university. "We do not feel at home here," he said. "The language is different, the way of life is different." Each nationality has its own secondary schools; they study each other's language, but few Russians master Latvian, while any Latvian who wants to succeed must speak Russian.

I had two guides in Riga – one Russian, one Latvian. They delighted in needling one another, playfully sometimes, more seriously others. Vladimir came from Moscow with me, the interpreter *Intourist* imposes on every traveling tourist. Arla came from Riga, a gay stylish Latvian girl, who had just finished the university.

Both were earnest spokesmen of the Soviet system. Both had a common Communist upbringing, and both strikingly similar attitudes on some subjects. For instance, jazz.

Arla was sure rock n' roll was the devil's advocate: "All that throwing and catching. First, we have no room for such things, and second, I would not allow a man to treat me that way."

Vladimir seconded: "Our rock n' roll is better. None of this breaking away from one another. It is milder, but not so dangerous."

I said they were missing the point. Rock n' roll was an individual dance which some Americans liked, some did not. But they could make their own choice, develop their own style. Was it not wrong to make everyone dance the same way?

"Well, we can do rock n' roll your way in private now," was Vladimir's reply.

The needling began the minute we left the airport. The streets in the outskirts of the city were lined with wooden gabled houses, some of them with the rococco flourishes found in Germany.

"How strange it all is," Vladimir marveled. "Everything is so different." A streetcar rolled by on the tracks up ahead. "I recognize that," he said, "but the ones in Moscow are not so old."

"Probably made in our new auto works," flashed Arla.

Next came the tour of the city.

"Why are none of the street signs in Russian?" Vladimir questioned.

"We can read them," answered Arla.

"But the Russians cannot."

"Latvians live here, not Russians. After all, this is not Moscow."

We arrived at St. Mary's Cathedral, the large domed Lutheran Cathedral – largest on the Baltic – which has recently been taken over by the state for a museum and concert hall.

"It has the largest organ in Europe, over 6,000 pipes," boasted Arla.

"Not true, they are building a larger one in the Chaikovsky Hall in Moscow," put in Vladimir.

"I said *now*."

"Oh, you mean for the time-being," corrected Vladimir. He had scored his point.

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We walked along the magnificent sand beach which runs its white way for 18 uninterrupted kilometers around the Bay of Finland. Holiday-makers from all over the Soviet Union and in every kind of bathing suit thronged the beach.

"It is more difficult to tell Latvian from Russian here," pondered Arla, "but I always can."

"How?" asked Vladimir.

"The Latvians have more style than the Russians. You have better materials, but we have better fashion."

"Yes," said Vladimir, the diplomat. "Moscow and Riga are the two fashion centers in the Soviet Union."

But Arla had not finished. "Also the Latvians are tall and blonde. The Russians are shorter and fatter."

How to tell Russians from Latvians is a game the Latvian will gladly play for the visiting tourist. In the park later that day, a young fellow walked up one path and down another pointing out the Russians. How did he know? "Oh, we just know," he answered mysteriously. Was he always right? I tested him. He swore that a girl reading on the park bench was Latvian. I went over and discreetly looked at the book. It was Russian and so was she.

For 15 years the Latvians have nursed their grudge. Their traditional contacts with the Western world have been severed. They have gone through a revolution and come out with a system different from anything in their history. Perhaps the Khrushchevian "peaceful coexistence" with the West means more to them, and their Baltic neighbors, than to others in the Soviet Union. It means that Riga and the other Baltic capitals are no longer closed to foreign visitors. It means the right to hear some foreign broadcasts and American jazz. It means a Latvian Lutheran student studying theology at Oxford University for the first time this autumn. They are only a small beginning, but a beginning. As one young optimist said: " 'Peaceful coexistence' may be a slogan to you, but it is our bridge to the outside world."

CAMBODIA

The Rivalry that Makes Independence Possible

A few months ago Western diplomats in Southeast Asia made no secret of their fears for Cambodia. Recognition of Peking had added momentum to the drift toward the Communist bloc and the Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, while protesting that Communism would mean the end of all he stood for in Cambodia, seemed cheerfully oblivious of the dangers in the course he had set. Most of the Cambodian press was pro-Communist and Chinese Communist technicians swarmed about the countryside, pushing bribes into the willing hands of provincial officials and searching for all manner of minerals.

The 500-bed Russian hospital going up on the outskirts of Phnom Penh was the pride and joy of almost every Cambodian who knew anything about it, and anti-Americanism was endemic. Old residents sometimes rubbed their eyes and wondered whether they were not in a Communist country when Sihanouk himself, bare to the waist and bursting with energy, led Iron Curtain and neutral diplomats together with reluctant Cambodian civil servants, on manual labor projects, digging with picks and heaving baskets of rocks.

Since early September, influenced both by the fighting in Laos and the arrogance of the Cambodian Communists, Sihanouk has arrested the drift. In fact, he has turned the boat sharply to starboard. "I've only got to go to the Soviet Embassy to see my Cambodian enemies," he is reported to have told one Western diplomat. "They're always all there."

The statement was exaggerated, since Prince Sihanouk's enemies are not all Communists: but the point Sihanouk made in private he has since been hammering in public. In both the French and the vernacular press he has attacked the Communists, both indigenous and foreign. He accused the Cambodian variety of being traitorous and wanting to lead the country away from neutrality into becoming a "satellite of the Eastern giant." To the giant itself he was seemingly more respectful, making frequent references to his friendship; but the point of his charge – that the Cambodian Communists received money and orders from abroad – was not intended to be overlooked.

On the Cambodian Communists themselves Sihanouk's remarks had no effect. But among the Cambodian people the Prince speaks with enormous authority: that the Communists are up to no good is a novel suggestion, but since the Prince says so it must be so.

This does not mean that the West has suddenly become endowed with new virtues. SEATO is still a convenient whipping boy and the rebels Son Ngoc Thanh and Sam Sary, with their pro-US Radio Free Cambodia and the constant hint of trouble around the Thai and Vietnamese borders, are enough in themselves to discredit these countries and their Western friends. And that is how Sihanouk feels it ought to be. "The interplay of American and Communist influence really makes our independence possible," he told a gathering of Cambodian students in Paris earlier this year. Play one against the other and all will be well. It is not a policy that could work in Laos: but given the isolation that Laos provides from direct contact with the Communists, it seems to be working passably well.

Denis Warner

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LONDON

A Conventional Blast at Massive Retaliation

This is the time of year when Whitehall usually sweats and strains in the birth pangs of the annual Defense White Paper which is published at the beginning of February. There had been little sign of the normal agony this year, however: it was universally assumed that the 1960 White Paper would be simply a progress report like that of 1959 – indeed there were rumors that the government might decide not to issue one at all.

Such was the situation until the afternoon of November 4, when the unnatural calm was shattered by a real blockbuster. Lieutenant-General Sir John Cowley, gave a lecture to the Royal United Service Institution which in the words of the *London Times* "rejected the core of Britain's official defense policy as defined in Mr. Sandys' 1958 Defense White Paper."

General Cowley is Controller of Munitions at the Ministry of Supply, a position significantly analogous with that held by General Gavin before he resigned from the US Army last year. The *Times* went so far as to say "there is no doubt that as a serving officer his remarks must have been approved by the War Office." It was this which gave them their tremendous impact, for they simply repeated what has always been the main criticism of present defense policy – namely, that the attempt to build an independent British thermonuclear deterrent was crippling Britain's ability to make a military contribution in fields which were in fact more relevant to her real defense needs.

"If the cost of the minimum credible deterrent proves to conflict with the cost of keeping enough forces to give military aid to friendly countries when asked, then I would choose the latter," he said. "I believe that the British contribution to the peace of the world can be far more useful in other directions than in producing weapons which are only useful because of their threat, and which can only be threatened in very exceptional circumstances."

He supported the deployment of tactical atomic weapons in Central Europe as a deterrent against mass conventional attack but thought that in limited war overseas "Britain should never be the first to use nuclear weapons, on grounds both of morality and expediency, and because of the difficulty of limiting their use." He made the point so often missed by amateur strategists, that in any limited war Britain would be in a foreign country and would be maintained through ports and airfields which were particularly vulnerable to atomic attack. "The easiest way to kill an army is to cut off its tail." And he had the courage to accept the political implication of this position. "Britain must therefore be careful not to become involved in parts of the world where her small army could be overwhelmed by masses of the enemy equipped with conventional weapons – otherwise she might be faced with the alternative of having to pull out or to initiate the use of nuclear weapons." Finally he committed the ultimate heresy for a British General in expressing a view on the morality of current policy as a whole: "I believe that in 100 years the mid-20th Century will be regarded as a nightmare period when mankind seriously considered destroying itself as a preferable alternative to reconciling two differing political views."

London was still buzzing with argument about this lecture when the Defense correspondent of the *News Chronicle* reported that the government was taking the prospect of a ban on nuclear weapons so seriously that it had ordered the services to draft plans for basing Britain's defense exclusively on conventional weapons – with all the increases in military production and manpower this would involve, including the possible return of conscription, at present scheduled to end next year.

It is difficult to know how seriously all these rumors must be taken. The government is now trying to discourage speculation by reprimanding General Cowley for the technical impropriety of uttering such views in public while still a serving officer. Mr. Sandys' unimpressive successor as Minister of Defense, Harold Watkinson, has gone so far as to order that in the future, "statements or lectures which bear on major defense policies of the government must be cleared by me." But the real question is whether Macmillan has changed his mind. It is certainly possible: to some extent the 1957 White Paper on Defense, with its excessive emphasis on the independent British deterrent, was part of the therapeutic treatment by which Macmillan sought to cure his Conservative Party of the neuroses induced by its humiliation at Suez.

There is evidence also to suggest that Macmillan is much more worried than he publicly admits by the imminent diffusion of nuclear weapons – and France may be only the first new member of the "nuclear club" – and might be prepared to go a long way to stop it. It is significant that whereas two years ago America had to push Britain into agreeing to negotiate about a test ban, now it is Britain which is pushing America – and Russia. The trouble is that here as in so many other fields of policy, the new British trend is running in the opposite direction to that of France and Germany, while America does not yet seem to have decided exactly what she wants. And unless America quickly gives a lead in seeking a more rational strategy for NATO in Europe, she will soon have lost the power to influence developments in the defense policy of her continental allies.

Denis Healey

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THE FACTS ABOUT NIXON – IX

The "New Nixon" made his first appearance in the '56 campaign during which the Vice President refused all invitations to take off his gloves and sock them and explained that he had to "appeal to swing voters, whom we must have to win." The team won easily, but despite the Presidential sweep, the Republican Party failed to win at the state and district level. This failure was even more conspicuous two years later, after the votes in the '58 election had been counted.

Repudiation in '58

by William Costello

For Nixon the campaign of 1958 was at once his best and his worst. On the one hand Communist subversion, the issue on which he had risen to prominence, was hardly mentioned; to the degree that his silence helped bury the issue, and to the degree that that help allayed fears of an irreconcilable schism in our national political life, the Vice President won approbation. On the other hand, the Republicans suffered their worst Congressional defeat since 1936; to the degree that his efforts to prevent a debacle were unavailing, his reputation as a winner was compromised.

For campaign purposes the image of the "new Nixon" of 1956 was transformed into the ideologically "newer Nixon" of 1958; but after the votes were counted, there came a realization that, like David without his sling, Nixon without his favorite issue was a poor match for the gigantic tides of national feeling that he was undertaking to manipulate.

In fairness it would be unrealistic to imagine that any individual could have redirected the massive undercurrents favoring the Democrats. Nixon could have been fully aware of the odds against him and could still have been a pawn of circumstance. Politically he had a gun at his head. The man in the White House was the first lame duck President to be categorically retired under the 22nd Amendment; when this constitutional inhibition was compounded by considerations of health – a mild cerebral stroke November 25, 1957, together with the earlier history of ileitis and a coronary occlusion – it was clear that little could be expected from a party leader in Eisenhower's state of physical and political debilitation. If there was to be, nationally, an authoritative voice of Republicanism, it had to be Nixon's.

Other factors intensified the Vice President's disadvantage. A recession starting late in 1957 had spiraled downward during the winter until unemployment stood at more than five million, most of the layoffs occurring in industrial areas where they took on a high degree of political visibility. The 85th Democratic Congress, seizing upon the recession as proof that the tight money, retrenchment policies of the Republicans were strangling the economy, took the initiative on a series of pump-priming measures not likely to alienate voters. Finally, the Dulles policy of brinksmanship was still producing equivocal results – in the Middle East where a revolt in Iraq foreshadowed new and unpredictable turbulence, and US Marine intervention in Lebanon dramatized no-one-knew-what threats to Western interests; and in Asia, where a new Communist Chinese feint at Quemoy again brought war talk to the surface.

For whatever causes – and they were many – the GOP was in trouble. On that point the pollsters were unanimous. To a politician of Nixon's experience, the omens could hardly have been worse. At intervals during the campaign, defensively and at times almost compulsively, he acknowledged his forebodings.

In his keynoter at Indianapolis September 29, he plunged straight into the subject: "We would just be kidding ourselves if we did not recognize right now that we Republicans have the fight of our lives on our hands this November. . . . Some of my Republican friends have even urged me to do as little as possible in this campaign so as to avoid being associated with a losing cause. My answer to that kind of talk is poppycock. We will lose if we continue to backpedal. We aren't going to win by giving the voters a diet of dishwater and milk toast. But we can win if we start slugging. . . ."

But he had lost some of the old enthusiasm for slugging, and he continued to shadowbox with defeatism. In Garden City, Long Island, October 23, he repeated: "Many friends have warned me of the political risks involved in being associated with a losing campaign. . . . What happens to me in this campaign is relatively unimportant. What happens to the Republican Party is more important. . . . Win or lose it is unforgivable to lack the courage to fight for the principles we believe in."

That same week in Baltimore, when asked on a televised press conference whether he had not become so

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"controversial" that he could not win in 1960, he avoided a direct answer, and showed his preoccupation with the impending defeat and its impact on his own future by saying that "regardless of how it might affect my political future, there is no choice – and I accept this choice, incidentally, gladly – there is no choice but to fight as hard as I can for those principles, and for the election of men who will support the President and his principles, and I intend to continue to do that regardless of the political consequences."

A Shift in Tactics

In laying out the general plan of the campaign, his handling of the issues developed fresh nuances. Instead of running four-square on the Eisenhower father image, as he had two years before, he reworked his material in a fashion that pushed Ike gently into the background. Emphasis shifted from the President to the corporate body of the Administration with which Nixon could identify himself. One passage in which Eisenhower had been ballyhooed in 1956 as the man who had got us out of one war and kept us out of others came out thus in the modified pitch: "This Administration got the United States out of one war, kept it out of others, and has kept the peace without surrender of principle or territory."

On civil rights and school integration the Vice President took on a strictly tactical position. Arguing that state and local voting trends were governed by local social patterns, he said civil rights were not worth stressing in an off-year since the issue would have little influence on the makeup of the new Congress, but he predicted the Republicans could capitalize on it profitably in 1960. On one occasion, however, in New York October 23, he made an exception to his rule with a statement denouncing Adlai Stevenson for criticizing Eisenhower's lack of leadership on civil rights. In a *tu quoque* argument, he asked how Stevenson proposed to enlist the support of Southern Governors in extending school integration, boasted, "We have done more in six years of this Administration than they talked of doing in 20 years," and concluded: "The fight on this issue is one that must be made within the Democratic Party."

Again, as a hedge against recession vote losses and in what was for him an unprecedented move to broaden the base of the party, Nixon refused to join Republicans like Goldwater of Arizona and Knowland of California in campaigning against labor; he warned that the GOP should not jockey itself into the "false position" of being opposed to the union labor movement. In another departure from orthodoxy, he argued in favor of making liberals as well as conservatives feel at home in the Republican Party; he told a Philadelphia breakfast rally there was need for both conservative and liberal points of view in a healthy party, thus breaking with Old Guardists of the Taft persuasion who fought to make the party the fortress of stand-pattism.

One incident, otherwise wholly insignificant, reflected his sensitivity to public-relations values. At San Diego, October 1, in reply to Democratic criticisms of the defense program, he said that he found "very disturbing . . . the implication that we are so scientifically poverty-stricken and that our industrial machinery is so ramshackle that everything we are going to do in the next few years will be wrong and everything the Communists do will be right. That is rotgut thinking."

To newsmen on the trip, most of whom by this time knew the basic speech almost as well as he did, the phrase "rotgut thinking" was new and picturesque, a throwback to earlier fighting campaigns, and the sort of thing that lent itself readily to a quick puff and a bold headline. On the strength of that one phrase, the San Diego speech got a heavy play in the press, and the reaction sounded a tremor of alarm. Republicans who liked to hear Nixon "pour it on" welcomed back the "old Nixon," the rocking-socking campaigner. Democrats and some commentators recoiled, however, pointing an accusing finger at the political roughneck who always seemed to be a little off side.

As if he had touched a live wire, Nixon dropped the word "rotgut" from his vocabulary. The staff member who had first incorporated it in a memo fell into disfavor and shortly afterward left the Vice President's entourage. It would be an exaggeration to say that the incident caused Nixon to panic, but intimate observers were aware that he was shaken by the criticism. From the beginning of his political career words like "rotgut" seemed to have a purely semantic quality in Nixon's campaign oratory. He employed them as one employs colored baubles to decorate a Christmas tree, with a sense that they were at once part of the dime store world of reality and at the same time no less a part of Saint Nicholas' legendary world of fantasy. On this as on more than one occasion in his career his basic sense of security was profoundly shaken by the discovery that where the lives and reputations of men are at stake words cannot be juggled about like colored tinsel.

Nixon's efforts to find a substantive issue for 1958 met with repeated frustration. Perhaps his best hope and his biggest disappointment was the foreign policy issue on which he was badly crossruffed in mid-October. At that time the outlook at Quemoy was still equivocal, still tense because of the continuing sporadic Communist bombardment. Although Harry Truman had come out flatly in support of President Eisenhower's policy on both Lebanon and Quemoy, the Democratic Advisory Council took a highly critical tone in a report challenging GOP foreign policy. In the ensuing flurry of charge and countercharge Nixon took a beating.

The Vice President as the chief campaign policymaker took it upon himself to leap forward October 13 with an *ad hominem* statement denouncing the Democratic

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Party's "sorry record of retreat and appeasement" and comparing the Eisenhower Administration's performance on foreign policy "with the record of failure of the seven years that preceded it" and the "defensive, defeatist fuzzy-headed thinking which contributed to the loss of China and led to the Korean War. In a nutshell," he said, "the Acheson foreign policy resulted in war and the Eisenhower-Dulles policy resulted in peace."

At the State Department the next morning Secretary Dulles was holding a news conference. The situation in Asia was precarious; Dulles had no wish to compound his difficulties with the indiscretions of campaign oratory, so when he was asked whether current aspects of foreign policy should be debated on the stump, he called the practice "highly undesirable" and added: "I would hope that both sides would calm down on this aspect of the debate."

Nixon did not take kindly to the rebuke and on the 15th Dulles switched his position, obviously under pressure from the indignant Vice President, to suggest there was need for a reply such as Nixon made to the weekend statement of the Democratic Advisory Council. That same day, however, President Eisenhower told his news conference: " . . . I do subscribe to this theory: foreign policy ought to be kept out of partisan debate. . . . I realize that when someone makes a charge another individual is going to reply. I deplore that. . . . America's best interests in the world will be served if we do not indulge in this kind of thing."

Continuing the Attack

Nixon's first instinct was to defend his position. As he was about to board a plane for Los Angeles, he told a San Francisco news conference: "One of the reasons the Republican Party is in trouble today is because we have allowed people to criticize our policies and we have not stood up and answered effectively. . . . I intend to continue to answer the attacks. . . . That's my view of a political campaign."

And then Vice President Nixon digressed from the immediate issue to philosophize about the nature of his own job as contrasted with that of the President. Acknowledging Eisenhower's statement that attacks on foreign policy should not be answered, he said: "This, I think, is a proper position for the President." But he added: "For us who have the responsibility of carrying the weight of this campaign to stand by and to allow our policies to be attacked with impunity by our opponents without reply would lead to inevitable defeat. . . . If my view of a political campaign differs from that which the President has expressed, the difference is not because of any difference we have as individuals. The difference is because of the positions we hold. He's the President of the United States, a man who has to mobilize the entire country behind his policy, if that is possible. I am the Vice President of the United States and have certain responsibilities in a political campaign."

"It Sure Must Have Been Potent, All Right"

On the record that false analogy left the issue right where it had been, with Nixon still charging Democratic policies led to war. Whereupon, on the 16th, Eisenhower took the final categorical step that removed Democratic patriotism as a partisan issue. He sent Nixon a telegram saying bluntly: "Both political parties have taken a common stand for a number of years on the essential foundations of a foreign policy. Both of us are dedicated to peace, to the renunciation of force except for defense, to the principles of the United Nations Charter, to opposing Communist expansion, to promoting the defensive and economic strength of the free world through cooperative action, including mutual aid and technical assistance.

"While in my view these, with rare exceptions, should not and do not lend themselves to political argument, the matter of administrative operation of foreign policy – whether or not agreed goals are in fact realized – has time and again been challenged both by ourselves in the past and very recently by some of our political opponents. . . . These actions, when criticized, should be supported by our side. No one can do this more effectively than you. At times," he added drily "it is of course difficult to distinguish between policy and administrative operations. . . ."

At intervals throughout the remainder of the cam-

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paign Nixon continued to make angry noises and occasional oblique references to Acheson, but on October 21 at Baltimore he all but threw in the towel. After a bitter attack on the "radical leadership" of the Democratic National Committee and the Advisory Council, he said.

> "In answer to these attacks, I want to reiterate what I have said on many occasions in the past. I do not question the sincerity or patriotism of those who criticize our policies. Our differences are not in ends but in means.
>
> "There is no war party in the United States. All Americans want peace.
>
> "There is no party of surrender in the US. . . .
>
> "There is only one party of treason in the United States – the Communist Party. . . .
>
> "Our differences arise in the means which will best accomplish this purpose. . . .
>
> "We believe that the policy of weakness and vacillation of the previous Administration which was developed under Mr. Acheson . . . has been tried and found wanting.
>
> "We have learned once and for all that in dealing with dictators – first with Hitler and then in Korea – a weak policy is a war policy, a firm policy is a peace policy."

After that, by further subtle shifts in his vocabulary, the Vice President accommodated himself to the White House policy line. On the last day of October he was repeating "a weak policy is a war policy; a firm policy is a peace policy," and in a plea for Democratic votes insisting the issue "is not between a Republican foreign policy and a Democratic foreign policy."

Barely a month later, during a BBC television interview in London, he frankly acknowledged having lost the round. A panelist asked whether it was true "you were gently rebuked by the President for making foreign affairs an election issue."

"Yes," Nixon replied, "as a matter of fact it is true."

Again on the corruption issue, Nixon found himself on the defensive for the first time because of the Goldfine-Sherman Adams case and the revelations of the House Legislative Oversight Committee. By that time the Eisenhower Administration had been in office long enough to collect its share of influence-peddlers and dubious-percenters, and there had ceased to be any mileage in being against sin.

None of these disappointments prevented Nixon from continuing his fight. He worked 24 hours a day – an effort that had genuine integrity regardless of his motives. He felt that he was the underdog, partly because the President was not giving him wholehearted support. At Salt Lake City October 16 he complained with restrained bitterness: "If all the members of the President's Cabinet will in the last three weeks of this campaign fight as effectively and as articulately" as Ezra Taft Benson, thousands of votes would be shifted.

In the end, however, the campaign was colorless because it lacked an affirmative, substantive issue – something to be "for." And it found only one windmill left standing to tilt against – the ephemeral "ADA left-wing" of the Democratic Party which never materialized. Nixon had tried his lance against the "ADA clique" in an earlier campaign, and had found it offered one advantage – it tended to stiffen the coalition of Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. To that degree, it served his immediate interests, but in 1958 he drew a blank, partly because the Presidency was not at stake and partly because the ADA had lost some of its militancy – had in fact moved in behind Sen. Lyndon Johnson of Texas on some issues – and its reputation for anti-Communism by this time was so well known in most parts of the country that it raised no hobgoblins.

In the Homestretch

Toward the end Nixon was trying to recast the image of his campaign, saying: "The issue, very simply stated, is this – guarantee progress for America by electing more Republicans. Stop progress by electing more Democrats." Along with that appeal, the phrases that occurred most frequently were: "Democrats from the free-spending wing of the party, the radical group from the North and the West" – "runaway inflation which a Congress dominated by radicals will inevitably bring about" – "Congress dominated by radicals and labor politicians" – "nominees on the Democratic ticket . . . exposed as helpless captives of the old radical wing" – "when you vote for more Democrats, you are voting to raise your taxes, cheapen your money, and to stifle new investment and enterprise" – "radical ADA left-wing" – "we have the fight of our lives on our hands."

In the homestretch he risked his political reputation still further by a series of optimistic forecasts that ran contrary to every poll and every independent sounding. In Wyoming: "I find increasing evidence that the political pollsters and prophets who have been predicting a decisive Democratic victory are in for the surprise of their lives on November 4." In Eau Claire: ". . . thousands of moderate Democrats will turn the tide in close races for the House and Senate in the Northern and Western states by voting for Republican candidates" – a bit of wishful thinking never to be fulfilled.

He sent all GOP candidates for House and Senate a secret telegram October 19, summarizing and cataloguing the ideas he had been expounding in his own barnstorming, and saying: ". . . the tide that was running so strongly against us has taken a sharp turn in our favor. . . . If we make the fight of our lives and mount a massive offensive . . . we can turn what appeared to be certain defeat into victory. . . . All Republican candidates

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and spokesmen should radiate optimism and should be on the offensive. . . . In a nutshell . . . why take a chance with a change? . . . I am convinced that if we hammer on this line from now to election day, we can blitz the opposition and shift thousands of votes in close races throughout the country."

The outcome November 4 was what all others had forecast – an unprecedented midterm victory for the Democrats. They gained 15 seats in the Senate, 46 in the House, and 9 Governorships. The total popular vote for members of the House, which had favored the Democrats in 1956 by the narrow margin of 29,831,608 to 28,697,321 – a difference of barely a million when the Republicans were running with the support of Eisenhower – shifted in 1958 to give the Democrats a margin of more than five million: a total of 25,365,961 for Democrats to 19,943,882 for Republican candidates.

Philip Potter of the *Baltimore Sun*, analyzing the results, concluded Nixon's herculean effort in 25 states to blitz the Democrats had been successful only in the case of 5 out of the 19 GOP Senate candidates for whom he spoke; of only one-third of the Republican aspirants for the House, and 3 Governors.

In Nixon's defense, as he himself pointed out at a Philadelphia rally, there were too many "turkeys" on the GOP list in '58; and where the party had outstanding candidates as in New York and Pennsylvania they were able to win, with or without Nixon's support.

In his own analysis of the outcome, he told reporter Earl Mazo half the losses could be attributed to the fact that the issues "ran against us from the time of the second term inauguration. . . ." And he listed those issues as the budget, Sputnik, the recession, and the Adams case, all of them calculated to keep the Administration on the defensive. The Republicans themselves, he said, were responsible for the other half of the losses – by fighting among themselves in California and Indiana, by forcing the right-to-work issue in Ohio, and "in other states because of poor organization and failure to run stronger candidates."

The most remarkable aspect of his failure was that he achieved new levels of moderation, but his moderation failed to get across. His mellowness was suspect or went unnoticed. The "Tricky Dick" image persisted. His choice of Democratic "radicalism" as an issue, he dismissed with an explanation whose cogency would be instantly apparent on Madison Avenue or in Hollywood.

"The President and I," he said, "used the term 'radical' to describe the economic philosophy of the Northern and Western wings of the Democratic Party because we felt that the term 'liberal' had become so corrupted in recent years that it could not accurately be used in describing that philosophy. . . . We used it [radical] only as a descriptive term . . . the opposite of moderate. . . ."

Hence, in this view, the campaign was fought over a twist of semantics, not on the question whether the Democrats were in a genuine, substantive sense believers in a radical socio-economic philosophy.

It was the chairman of the Republican National Committee, Meade Alcorn, who summed up the meaning of the election at Des Moines, January 22, 1959, when he proposed a look at "some frightening figures": "In 1950 the population of the United States was 150 million," he said. "Approximately 20 million people voted in the midterm elections for Republican candidates for Congress. In 1958 there were 175 million Americans and again 20 million of them voted for Republican Congressional candidates. Through those same eight years the Democrats increased their Congressional vote from 20 million in 1950 to 25.7 million in 1958. In other words, while we have stood still as the population increased, our opposition has steadily enlarged its vote turn-out.

"Despite the two great Presidential sweeps of 1952 and 1956," Alcorn concluded, "the Republican Party has not won what could properly be called a national party victory since 1946 when the 'had enough' temper of the country touched off a landslide."

It was certainly no more than coincidence that Nixon's public career spanned the 12-year interval from the emotion-charged "had enough" landslide of 1946 to the electorate's bleakly unemotional repudiation of the Republican Party in 1958. In that interval he had risen from obscurity to stand at the threshold of the Presidency; three times, as Eisenhower surmounted grave illnesses, the Vice President was no more than a heartbeat from the White House. In his climb he had built large reservoirs of gratitude in the state Republican organizations as a tireless cheer leader and money raiser.

The irony of it was that, at the pinnacle, he should have had to lead the Republican Party to its worst defeat in two decades and at the same time see an attractive rival, a rival whose very name connoted an identity with the party's financial pipelines, be propelled from nowhere into the race for the Presidency.

NEXT WEEK: *Nixon in the House – "I was elected to smash the labor bosses"*

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The Auden-Isherwood Collaboration

by Stephen Spender

Mr. Auden and Mr. Isherwood would scarcely have called this volume "two great plays" so presumably this name was chosen by the publishers, and a mild protest is necessary. They could scarcely have hit on an epithet less suitable than "great" to describe two early experiments made in collaboration by two writers each of whom has done far better work without the assistance of the other. "Great" is the one thing these plays are not. They are lively hit-or-miss affairs, by now something of a historic curiosity, steeped in that part of the atmosphere of the 1930's which was the peculiar result of Auden's influence during his English period. Today they inadvertently throw a good deal of light on Auden's and Isherwood's reasons for becoming American citizens: impatience and disgust with the England of Baldwin and Ramsay MacDonald provides far the most effective satire in a volume whose final scene offers bitterly the toast "England, England, England."

Two Great Plays
by W. H. Auden and
Christopher Isherwood
(The Dog Beneath the Skin
and *The Ascent of F6)*
(Modern Library; $.95)

The home country plays almost the role of Ireland in the early work of James Joyce. Indeed perhaps by now one might apply to English cultural activity Yeats' summing up of Ireland, "Much hatred, little room." Both plays are written within the context of apathetic and neurotic between-wars British democracy threatened by the dictatorship of "Ostnia." In *The Dog Beneath the Skin*, the central and longest scene takes place in an insane asylum, the lunatics being addressed from time to time by one of their number who calls himself The Leader. It is too like a scene from everyday life in an English preparatory or private boarding school to be altogether effective; the preoccupation with the values and behavior of English upper-class education gives the plays a juvenile air. It is a great pity that the fog of schoolboy low and high spirits prevents one from taking them as what they ought to be: accounts of the modern young hero in search for his soul in the circumstances of England putrescent with retired colonels, vicars, schoolmasters and politicians – all adding up to a smaller evil confronted by the much vaster one of Hitler.

The Dog Beneath the Skin is the more loosely constructed of the two plays. It is a charade in which the hero, Alan, sets out from the village of Pressan Ambo, to look for the squire's long lost heir Francis, who turns out to be the dog who accompanies him on his wanderings. The journey takes Alan to a brothel, an insane asylum, a garden of paradise (whose inhabitants are absorbed in fulfilling their narcissistic dreams) an operating theater (of invalids praying to have important surgery performed on them) a grand hotel (in which the hero is seduced by the screen actress Miss Lou Vipond). A good deal of this is brilliant and amusing, but the episodes are chosen too much to illustrate the early Auden's kill-or-cure view of life: "If we really want to live, we'd better start at once to try; if we don't, it doesn't matter, but we'd better start to die." Alan, the hero, is a Candide with the mental age of Peter Pan, whereas Voltaire's hero has the age of Cherubino in *Figaro*. The seven or eight years' difference of mental age makes it possible to think of Candide as a real and attractive person, whereas Alan is too infantile.

All the same, some of the choruses and lyrics are the very best Auden. The fault is that the extraordinary insight which went into writing them is not at any point dramatized in the play's situations or characters.

The same basic fault prevents *The Ascent of F6* from realizing in action an extremely interesting and serious idea. The writing is often marvelous, (Ransom's monologue with which the play opens being Auden at his very best), but the characterization and plot are spoiled by self-indulgence in Auden's pet theories. Ransom, the hero, has the makings of a character in a real play. Modelled on T. E. Lawrence, he is divided between conscience-stricken, cruelly self-critical self-abnegation and the passion to act and be a leader. He sees himself as one fated to sacrifice the other members of the expedition to his own secret ambition to shine; and yet he has the makings of a poet and a saint. Around him there cluster the causes and effects of a publicly-paraded enterprise of explorers leading very remote and individual lives of adventure and yet the victims of publicity. All this is magnificent material. Mr. and Mrs. A, "ordinary" people who sit in a box at the side of the stage and react, while listening to radio accounts of the ascent to that projection of their private frustrations which is the expedition, are remarkably successful. In adapting the style of Eliot's *Sweeney Agonistes* for their speeches, Auden manages to give distinction and quality to their dangerously banal role.

Unfortunately however, plot and characters are overlaid by that most stifling piece of psychological machinery ever invented, the mother fixation. It is Ransom's mother who persuades him early on that he must serve England and snub the Ostnians by ascending the mountain before their highly mechanized expedition does so, thus preventing the Ostnians from destroying British prestige among the Asians and threatening the Empire. It is his mother whom, in a vision, he meets at the mountain-top, when he collapses and dies.

These two plays confront us with the problem of why such a combination of talents failed. For I think there is no doubt that these plays leave one with the double impression of being half brave attempts, half cynical exercises. One is left with the feeling that either

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of these writers would, by himself, made something more interesting of either of these plays. Isherwood alone would have grappled to create vivid characters, Auden alone would have given imaginative life to his situations instead of relying on Isherwood's great gifts as a scenario-writer to carry through incompletely imagined ideas.

This seems to have been not so much a collaboration as a pooling of talents, assumed to be complementary to one another, and an acceptance of rather facile compromises whenever the plays demanded a real fusion of Auden's fantasy with Isherwood's ironic realism. Neither writer seems to have pushed his insight to the point where it either made real demands, or imposed checks, on the other's whimsicality. Isherwood, making way for Auden's poetic psychologizing, does not develop characters; Auden sees the characters as machines to be explained in term of theories about mother-fixations and so on. Auden's poetry on the other hand makes way for Isherwood's style of creating scenes which look like reportage.

In short, the overwhelming defect of these plays is that they do not have characters or situations lived into by either of their writers. They give a curious impression like that of a temple in which the architect displays considerable genius on externals but loses interest, even displays indifference, when he comes to the inmost sanctum. The brilliant lyric "You're in the racket too" which occurs in *The Dog Beneath the Skin* seems to apply a bit to the success story of the 1930's, and one feels this nowhere more than in these plays.

All the same there are qualities of gaiety, fantasy, and brilliance here which one regrets were not developed further. At present, a rather dingy revival seems to be going on in the English theater, certainly more violent and explicit than in other branches of English literature, though committed to a kind of social realism which is too closely bound up with the writers' mourning over their own circumstances before they have become famous. One could wish that there were a greater achievement in the plays of Auden and Isherwood to influence the theater today. Of course, the reputations of these writers are unaffected by their early experiments, part success and part failure. The loss is ours. It is a pity they did not go far enough to wish to go further.

Cold War and Nuclear Dilemma

by Reinhold Niebuhr

This volume by one of the grand old men of American philosophy, with a life-long interest in political problems, is prompted by, and directed to, the cold war and the nuclear dilemma,

The Strength of Men and Nations
by William Ernest Hocking
(Harpers; $3.50)

which dominates the lives and thoughts of our generation. Hocking declares that it interests him that he and his fellow octogenarian, Lord Russell, "poles apart in metaphysical position," should address themselves at about the same time to the great peril of our age. It is my opinion that Hocking is wiser than Russell in his analysis of the problem. He serenely and impartially surveys the situation of the two great powers wrestling near a dangerous abyss of a nuclear war into which mankind may be plunged by the miscalculation of either side. One need not agree with all of Hocking's judgments in order to be impressed by the nobility of his mind.

Though speaking of the calculated risks of nuclear disarmament, Hocking does not devote much attention to the difficulties of achieving a disarmament accord. He wisely observes that mutual trust must create the condition for disarmament and therefore turns his thought to the problem of bridging the chasm between the two great powers.

Hocking's argument contains two main strands of thought. The first is his insistence that both systems are changing under the pressures of history and are not really as antipolar as is popularly esteemed. His other strand of thought consists in an analysis of the virtues and weaknesses of each side. In this, he achieves a remarkable degree of objectivity despite his remaining a devoted exponent of a free society, one who believes that the only cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy. The only bias I can detect is his belief that America is more fitted for the task of reconciliation than any other nation, citing our achievement in helping to build up a united Western Germany and a healthy European economy to prove it. I should have thought that a more modest estimate of our peculiar virtues as a nation was indicated by some of Hocking's own comments on our national weaknesses.

The ideological chasm between the US and the USSR is not, as he rightly says, as deep as the polemics between capitalism and Communism imply. To be sure, Russia is ruled by an oligarchy and we are a democracy. But he thinks that the stereotypes by which the Russians interpret us do not do justice to the measure of collective control which modern democracies of the West have established, even as we do not realize that Russian realities are changing very rapidly under the dynamics of a technical society which is granting ever more consideration to the average consumer. In short, the stereotypes drawn from Stalinist despotism do not fit the present. Hocking admits that tyranny is still a possibility in this oligarchic structure, but a waning one.

He asserts that Russian mistrust of the US is based on a false analysis of capitalism; and he rather leans over backwards to prove that part of the mistrust is due to the early attempts to destroy Communism. He thinks that our mistrust is based on the Communist dogma of the ultimate triumph of Communism and our belief that the Communists will use military means to assure this triumph; but he rightly calls attention to the essential change in emphasis since the death of Stalin, quoting Walter Lippmann and Adlai Stevenson in support of his contentions that the Russians honestly believe their system will triumph by peaceful means. He thinks it dangerous to speculate about the motives of an adversary and believes, rightly I think, that motives are malleable.

These wise observations about the changing realities are necessary anodynes for abating the polemical fever. But Hocking's comparison of the relative merits of both sides are disturbing because they tend to prove that our democratic achievements put us at a

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disadvantage in the power struggle. For, as he observes, our production is governed by the requirements of consumer interests, while in the Russian system, consumption is determined by a production system, rigorously controlled by the state and able to subordinate consumer demands to the total power needs of the state whether in military expenditure or foreign aid. I find this observation, amply proved by many recent studies, rather frightening. So too is the observation, that an undemocratic system will seem more relevant to many budding nations than a system of economic and political freedom which is not adapted to their stage of development. Yet Hocking seems undisturbed by these disturbing facts about our disadvantages in competitive coexistence. Though not blind to the distortions of the ideal of a free society, he remains a serene democrat throughout. In the light of his criticisms, one wonders why he is so sure that the only cure for democracy is more democracy.

His plea for understanding, creative as it is in a day threatened by nuclear annihilation, seems moreover to assume that the elimination of ideological differences and misconceptions would radically alter the struggle. It might narrow the chasm between the two powers or communities; but history abounds in struggles between ideologically similar communities and civilizations. There is a powerful will to survive and will to preserve the freedom of a community which is not necessarily altered even if it is shown that our culture is not as good, and that of the adversary not as bad, as we had assumed.

Hocking tries to solve this problem by a long chapter on "Our Double Morality," in which he recounts the obvious fact that the morality of communities is on a lower level, and in contradiction to, personal morality. He seems to think that we have reached a stage where we can overcome the contradiction. In this chapter he seems to me to be least persuasive and the most optimistic and even utopian. It is true that the threat of a nuclear war may prompt mankind to think of the fate of mankind and not the fate of a nation or a culture. It is this fear, in fact, which has preserved the peace until this moment. Without the threat of a destruction which might make the difference between victors and vanquished difficult to discern, we might now be at war. This is the positive aspect of the "balance of terror." But even this fear will not destroy the natural and inevitable impulses of nations, communities and cultures to preserve their life and freedom. Of course, they hope to do it without a war. But each would find it difficult to purchase peace at the price of subjugation. It is this final moral perplexity of our age which Hocking has failed, in my opinion, to analyze profoundly enough.

"CHINA IS NOT *a mere puppet of Russia, like Bulgaria or Albania, but a junior ally. As against the West, there is no international breach between the two, nor will there be within the useable future. Peiping and Moscow function as two non-identical but complementary arms of the single anti-Western world revolution. They will not, and indeed they cannot try to cut each others' throats until they have finished cutting ours.*"

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. N-A, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y., for free copy.

Assassin with an Ice-Pick

by Jacques Katel

It will soon be 20 years since a blow from an ice-pick eliminated Stalin's most hated enemy, Leon Trotsky. *The Mind of an Assassin* shows how the murder was accomplished. Little of the material is new. The identity of the assassin has been known for more than ten years, and the fact that the man who calls himself Jacques Mornard is Ramon Mercader has been generally accepted.

But the book is timely. A few days ago, and for the first time from an official rostrum in the Soviet Union, Stalin's successor publicly mentioned the hitherto unmentionable name. To be sure Nikita Khrushchev did not cite Trotsky with approval. He attacked Trotsky's policy at the time of Brest-Litovsk – the policy of "no war, no peace." Khrushchev needed to explain that Trotsky had not been right. But it sounded as if a controversy were being opened – or rather reopened – a controversy that was so heatedly discussed in 1917-18.

The Mind of an Assassin
by Isaac Don Levine
(Farrar, Straus and Cudahy; $4.50)

During his visit to the United States, Anastas Mikoyan also spoke of Trotsky. It was at a private gathering and the subject was Trotsky's role in the founding of the Soviet state. Mikoyan, like Khrushchev, did not resort to Stalinist vilification. But when he spoke of Trotsky as being a "bureaucrat," he touched upon a nerve which has long agitated the Communist Party, for it was Trotsky who warned of the bureaucratization of the Communist movement.

Stalin had at his disposal the best propaganda machine the world has known. He commanded judges, prosecutors, and defendants ready to recant, to accuse Trotsky (the principal target of the Moscow trials); he had stooges and dupes all over the world; he had an unlimited supply of bullets. It took him more than ten years to "liquidate Trotsky" physically. But he never succeeded in "liquidating" history.

In confiding his archives to Harvard University, Trotsky stipulated that part of them could be published only 20 years after his death, the other part another 20 years hence. The historic foresight shown by Trotsky is amazing. He was murdered on August 20, 1940. And today he emerges from oblivion – in the Soviet Union as well as in the West. A few months ago, Trotsky's diaries, written in exile in 1935, were published by Harvard Press. Now paperback editions of his autobiography are about to be published in the United States. Isaac Deutscher's *The Prophet Unarmed* – the second volume devoted to the life of Trotsky – has appeared recently. A novel based on the assassination of Trotsky, *The Prince Must Die*, enjoyed this year a short and moderately successful career.

In exposing the personality of the assassin, Mr. Levine also throws some light on the present rulers of the Soviet Union. Although Khrushchev can cite the name of Trotsky at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet without risking death or exile, the successors of Stalin (the

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"epigones" Trotsky would have said) still use Stalin's methods when they attack a political opponent. In his attempt to strengthen Soviet ties with the US, Khrushchev found that it was the American left, the labor movement, which most firmly resisted his advances and his smiles, which understood and did not forget the past. During his stay in this country, Khrushchev announced that his divergencies with the American labor leaders whom he met in San Francisco were "irreconcilable," and shortly thereafter a personal vilification campaign against Walter Reuther started in the Soviet press.

An excerpt and analysis in Mr. Levine's book of the so-called confession of the so-called Jacques Mornard illustrates the methods used by both Stalin and his pupil Khrushchev. In this "confession," found on his person after the crime, the assassin accuses his victim of being solely animated by "hate and the desire for vengeance." It was characteristic of the Soviet secret police (then called NKVD, which of course was the author of this so-called confession) "to accuse Trotsky not of a wrong-headed policy, but of the most heinous personal defects and common crimes. . . ." According to the assassin, Trotsky was a tyrant in his personal relations, took money from foreign governments, and plotted the murder of his hosts.

Walter Reuther, as described by the organ of the Soviet Trade Unions, *Trud*, is not merely betraying the American working class, but is a miser and a bad husband to boot.

This was and is the pattern. Some of the shady characters who were involved in the plot to kill Trotsky still live in the United States – some of them in jail or free on bail or still undetected undercover agents of the Soviet secret police. Mark Zborowski, who last week won his appeal for a new trial on an earlier conviction for perjury, is described by Isaac Don Levine as the "finger man." Jack Soble, a confessed Soviet spy who plead guilty and is now in prison, admitted that his first assignment was to spy on Leon Trotsky.

It has often been said that Stalin had developed a pathological hatred of Leon Trotsky. This may be so. Stalin knew that in the unavoidable struggle against Nazi Germany he could count on the Russian people's patriotism to defend Russian soil. But Stalin also foresaw the initial defeats, the large-scale disaffection (particularly after the Finnish winter war where he had seen thousands upon thousands of Soviet soldiers surrender to the enemy). And he knew that inevitably the Soviet soldier, peasant and worker would think back to the civil war, would remember the man who had created the Red Army and led it to victory. The civil war was – and still is – part of the Russian folklore. Trotsky, alive, could have become more than a thorn in the flesh, he would have been a possible substitute in the time of military disintegration, which indeed took place in the first months of war against Hitler.

Trotsky is quoted by Levine as predicting that Stalin's plans to kill him would be put into action when major military events were distracting the attention of the world – the first attempt took place during the battle of France and the second and successful attempt coincided with the invasion of Britain which was expected at that time.

It seems almost foreordained that the most powerful police machine would finally succeed in "liquidating" one man and a handful of his followers. On the basis of what Trotsky's former guards and secretaries told him, Don Levine concludes that it was Trotsky's own "gullibility" which was responsible for his death. But Trotsky would not have been Trotsky without this "gullibility." He refused to live in a bombproof bunker in his fortified villa in Coyocan, a suburb of Mexico City. And of this villa itself, Trotsky said to his friends, "It reminds me of the first prison I was in at Kherson. The doors made the same sound when they shut. It is not a home; it's a medieval prison."

According to Levine, Trotsky

> ". . . consented to all these drastic changes (fortification of his villa, increase in the Mexican police guard, increase in the number of personal 'exceptionally tough' American 'inner' guards) with reluctance. He had all along been opposed to the introduction of a regime in his establishment which would subject everyone who entered it to a search for concealed weapons. He also vetoed the proposal to make it an iron rule that he should never talk to anyone alone in his study. 'Trotsky could not endure either of these rules,' wrote Joseph Hansen (one of Trotsky's secretaries). 'Either we trust the people and admit them without search, or we do not admit them at all.' He could not bear having his friends submit to search. . . . Mutual suspicion in his eyes was a disintegrating force much worse than the inclusion of a spy in the organization, since

Postcard Harlequin

Woman of journeys, always you send the picture
Posthaste out of your love. This time Picasso:
Motley is here diaphanous – red for the heart,
Light brown for thought, blue shading life towards art.

The blue Napoleonic hat, the tights
And lacey cuffs define his art, and light
Brings forth the life. Sad in his thoughtful giving,
The Seated Harlequin asks what of living?

Maybe a Mediterranean of widening blue,
Perhaps a woman's heart that once he knew
Maternally. Or the stranger's glance revealing
The sad conflict under the clown's cartwheeling.

O Harlequin of hearts, why so disturbing,
Set in a wall of blue, a mood of yearning?
Your pastel shades will draw me like a ghost,
To your world-weighted eyes the willing host.

Douglas Nichols

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such suspicions are useless anyway in uncovering a highly skilled provocateur."

Trotsky's aim was certainly not physical survival exclusively. He had a political heritage to leave and in order to do so he had to amass it, he had to be part of the life that was going on. It can be argued that the assassin, if searched, could have been prevented from wielding the ice-pick. But then, perhaps, Trotsky would have been politically dead.

Some of the precautions that were taken and which Levine describes – electric devices, machine gun posts, revolvers lying handily on Trotsky's desk, alarm switches, logbooks, etc. – were no doubt necessary. But in any case they were pitifully insufficient.

Many other people around Trotsky were also eliminated – either by Stalin or by natural causes. Some of their names (but by no means all) appear in the book. They were part of the highly intelligent, incorruptible group who were with Trotsky in Prinkipo, in France, in Norway, and for a time in Mexico. Men like Erwin Wolf, murdered in Spain, and Rudolf Klement, whose headless body was fished out of the Marne, to name only those two, had to be disposed of first before Stalin could even think of approaching "the Old Man."

Trotsky knew his enemy. Levine quotes him as writing in 1936 that what Stalin sought was to "strike not at the ideas of his opponent but at his skull." Conversely, Trotsky wanted to preserve his ideas first, then his skull. But whether we agree with Leon Trotsky or whether we disagree with him, his role in the Russian revolution and his writings are part of our historic heritage. By the time the assassin is released from the Mexican jail where he is serving a 20 year sentence, he may have concluded (as has his mother, quoted by Levine) not only that he committed a heinous crime but also a largely useless one. He was the hired hand of one man and not even of one regime or of one party. It may be that a deeper understanding of the real role the killer played will be a greater punishment than the 20 years of anonymity behind bars.

TELEVISION

Killing Flies with a Sledge

The quizlings, at least those who didn't lie to the Grand Jury, are "criminals" to whom no one can fit a crime. The guilt itself is elusive, because the victim was really this hallucination in the public mind, which suddenly beheld something symbolic and portentous in a child's game. Quiz shows, as intellectual exercise, are like doing a phenomenal number of deep knee bends, a total waste of energy. There is no intrinsic value in them, except as entertainment. No one, so far as I have read, has asked a critical question – why are unrigged quiz shows any better than rigged ones? The producers, a notoriously realistic lot, not at all given to romanticizing their business, apparently found they were distinctly more entertaining when they were *produced* to create the appearance of conflict and effort. There was no particular harm in this until they became inflated with importance. And this inflation was not altogether the fault of the TV industry.

The enormous apparatus of the newspapers and national magazines had a lot to do with it. There was of course the *Time* cover story in February, 1957, searching out significance by the yard and bushel not only in what Van Doren was doing but what people were supposed to think of him. He was to be to intellectuals what Mickey Mantle was to a public that took baseball more as a passion than a game. It was forgotten that Mickey Mantle's business is performing for money, and that the intellectuals' job, if indeed there is such a thing, is creating.

The root trouble lies in the transformation of journalism and entertainment into full-time business, committed to fill hours and empty pages by the millions, whether or not there is anything to be said. Would quiz shows have absorbed so much energy and attention in another century, when the size of a newspaper depended upon what news there was to be reported? This is not to say there were not silly fads in earlier times, but I suspect none so artificially inflated. The press runs about killing flies with a sledge. It is geared to war, strikes and extravagances, and the trivia it reports is raised to the same level.

Walking from this ridiculous world into the sanity of a TV studio, where bright, neat men talk forcefully and simply about what they are trying to do, a contestant had every right to be impressed. The dialogue is the same for every show: "Look, the people, they're tired, come home from the noodleworks, they tuned in for a little show. That's what we're giving them, something they should forget their feet hurt and their wife got the menopause. For culture we got Sunday and Leonard Bernstein. So who's hurt?"

Why not? It was only a game. And it was not only the producers who told Van Doren that, as intellectual lagniappe, he was making education respectable. It was *Time*, *The New York Times*, and probably half the people he met. The contestants were seduced not by the producers but by the hallucination that they shared by and large with the public and the public press.

We dream on and on, judging by last week's issue of *Life* which announces doom and moral collapse lurking behind the quiz shows. There is no such thing, only a deplorable tendency of *Life* to see pie in the sky. In the same issue it glorifies the seasonal idiocy of college football. By no stretch of the imagination can its story be read as a detached report. Thus we add pressure to a child's sport, and an expectancy and hope that ruptures so painfully when some benighted player half mad with youth and the shock of play breaks someone's jaw with an illegal punch. It started out as a friendly game.

FRANK R. PIERSON

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Stephen Spender *is at present on a lecture tour of the US.* Reinhold Niebuhr, *the distinguished theologian, is the author of a new book,* The Structure of Nations and Empires. Jacques Katel *was formerly a UN correspondent for the* Agence France Presse.

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THEATER

Love Does It Again

The Tenth Man
by Paddy Chayefsky
(Booth Theater)

Since most of Paddy Chayefsky's previous writings give the impression of having been pieced together out of conversations overheard on an IRT subway platform, *The Tenth Man* is something of a new departure for this author. The characters have more flavor and élan, the plot is constructed around a sturdier scaffolding than the trivial incidents of soap opera, and, for the first time, the dialogue seems to have been written rather than tape-recorded. Chayefsky's identifying characteristic has always been his morbid preoccupation with the mediocre and the banal, but in *The Tenth Man* – set in a delapidated Long Island synagogue and revolving around a Jewish maiden possessed by an evil spirit – he is flirting with the outlandish and the strange. While his passion for minutiae remains constant, it is no longer centered on the sordid details of soiled linen and wrinkled beds but rather on the atmospheric intricacies of cabalistic rituals. The bard of butchers, bobby soxers, and bachelor parties has experienced an unexpected metamorphosis into a spinner of exotic fantasies.

The Tenth Man is Chayefsky's first work to be written expressly for the stage (*Middle of the Night* was a converted TV script), and so this metamorphosis may have been partly dictated by the new medium. Television audiences, as we know, are addicted to the commonplace, but the Broadway spectator has more of an appetite for the exotic, providing it conforms to conventional expectations. In *The Tenth Man*, Chayefsky is exploiting the local color of the Orthodox Jew in the same manner that Joshua Logan last season exploited the Oriental. The stage is populated by bearded worshippers in prayer shawls and phylacteries – disheveled, argumentative, superstitious, charming, goodhearted types – who are given to commenting at length, in studied upward inflections, on ungrateful children, cemetery plots, rabbis, and the Old Country. Tyrone Guthrie – when he is not grouping the characters in the attitudes of a Chagall painting – gives the show away by directing it like a cartoon, and the performers (with the exception of Arnold Marlé in a powerful characterization) are concerned less with acting in depth than with ingratiating themselves with the audience. The result is an amiable personae who possess humor but no essential reality – Orthodox Jews who pray in English and scrupulously refrain from using Yiddish phrases. One reviewer has called them "universal," which is one way of saying that they never break the conventions of dialect comedy by displaying anything unique, individual, or true.

This is not to say that dialect jokes cannot be immensely amusing; and when this garrulous coterie holds the stage, things are very lively indeed. Chayefsky makes a comic juxtaposition between Old World simplicity and New World complexity, and most of his jokes stem from the bewildering effect of a bustling New York civilization on these cloistered, hermetic creatures. Quite often, this humor is strikingly successful: the play's most effective moment is an extended vaudeville about two Jews who have never before left Mineola trying to find the right train to Williamsburg. Sometimes, especially in the hands of the director, it is rather forced: Guthrie has one *alte kocher* enter the synagogue, take off his coat, and reveal a red football sweater underneath. But aside from the success of the jokes, they seem to me fundamentally un-Jewish in character. Yiddish humor is traditionally based on a contrast between the Jew's practical sense of reality and the lofty ideals of the more refined society outside, but Chayefsky has made the Jews the impractical ones. In this play, simplicity, superstition, and mystical awe are supreme virtues, and one remains pure in heart by turning one's back on the Enlightenment.

In the main plot, this latter-day obscurantism results in spurious theatrics. *The Tenth Man* is the story of a disturbed girl who has been spirited from an asylum by her grandfather. To the muddled outside world she seems insane, but when she begins speaking in the accents of a whore from Kiev, the Jews conclude that her soul has been inhabited by a dybbuk and begin searching for a Chassidic rabbi to exorcise the demon. A young man enters, defeated, cynical, and suicidal – an unbeliever under analysis who has concluded that life is meaningless. In his presence, the girl's distemper takes a different form (she thinks she is a De Mille movie star), and so he foolishly assumes that she is psychotic. In more lucid moments, she decides she loves him, but when he speaks of the impracticability of such a marriage, she asserts that he too is possessed by a dybbuk which will not permit him to love. A dialectic ensues between the boy and a renegade rabbi named Hirschman who tries to persuade him to mysticism ("It is better to believe in dybbuks than in nothing at all") but he stands fast in his scientific explanation of behavior. The exorcism rite proves him wrong. It is the boy's demon which is banished; permitted now to love, he cures the girl by the strength of his feeling. As the happy couple leave, and the codgers line up to wave them out of the door, Hirschman reads the moral: "He still doesn't believe in God – he just wants to love – and when you think of it, gentlemen, is there any difference?"

Perhaps this ending might have seemed less sentimental, flabby, and evasive had the play remained within the confines of a fairy tale, but Chayefsky's object is to comment on the modern, particularly the Freudian, view of objective reality. Now Freudianism is open to criticism on many scores, but it can hardly be confuted by demonstrating that it is incompatible with a world which exists only in an author's fantasy. One might have guessed – from his exaggerated obsession in previous works with naturalistic dirt and cobwebs – that Chayefsky disliked reality, but the extent of this distaste was never clear till now, and one may hazard that his quarrel is less with Freud than with the Reality Principle. Like the Catholic Graham Greene and the mystic Carl Dreyer, Chayefsky has used the dramatic form to create a world more consonant with his hopes, and, like them, he

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has not hesitated to invent a few miracles to prove this wish-world is the true one.

As for Hirschman's moral, the curtain unfortunately descends before anyone can shout, yes, there is a difference between religion and romantic sentiment, and a profound one too, but the Broadway audience seems perfectly satisfied with such soft-headed conclusions. *The Tenth Man* is Chayefsky's most entertaining dramatic work but it openly betrays that omnipresent molasses which seeps under the flinty exterior of all his writings. Unlike Greene and Dreyer, Chayefsky holds to no traditional religious doctrine; instead, he melts down all doctrines into the gluey ooze of Love.

In this, he is one with almost every American playwright writing for the commercial theater. At the end of the Elizabethan period, in a time of conspicuous animalism and depravity, most dramatists adopted a philosophy of defeat called Stoicism with which to confront the hypocrisy of the social world and the indifference of the universe. In the American age, when decay, hypocrisy, and corruption are equally conspicuous, most dramatists have adopted a philosophy of defeat called Love with which to obscure unpleasant, difficult truths under a haze of romantic abstraction. Hiding their lights beneath a bushel of facile sentiment, they have thus become less the conscience of society than another symptom of its ills.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

RECORDS

From the Standard Repertory

The reissue of Cetra records provide an opportunity – which no one should miss – to acquire the performance, on Cetra 1232, of Rossini's *William Tell*, a work that impressively demonstrates his powers for more than operatic comedy, especially in what Berlioz rightly referred to as the marvel after marvel in the second act. Apart from the hard and tight singing by the tenor Filippeschi, the performance offers beautiful singing by Carteri, Taddei, Corena, Tozzi and others with the orchestra and chorus of Turin Radio under Rossi; and with treble turned down to cancel a treble boost the recorded sound is very good. In addition, 1208 offers excerpts from Rossini's *Cenerentola* – whose writing in lyric, comic and florid bravura styles I find even more brilliant than that of *The Barber of Seville* – sung superbly by Simionato and Valletti, among others, with the same orchestra, chorus and conductor, and worth having even with occasional distortion in the vocal sound (a treble boost must again be canceled). Donizetti's comedy masterpiece, *Don Pasquale*, is on 1242, with excellent singing by Noni, Valletti and Bruscantini, and the same orchestra, chorus and conductor again. The recorded sound is good. And his *Elisir d'Amore* is on 1235, with the same principals, of whom Valletti this time does some surprisingly mannered and tasteless singing, and with the orchestra and chorus of Rome Radio under Gavazzeni. The recorded sound is good. Valletti's performances of his arias in *Don Pasquale* and *L'Elisir* and of uninteresting arias from *The Daughter of the Regiment* are on a single record, 50154; and 55002 has his beautiful singing in arias from *Don Giovanni*, *Barber of Seville*, *L'Italiana in Algeri*, *Sonnambula*, *Manon* and *Werther*.

Something of an event is the first complete recording of Haydn's Quartets Op. 71 and Op. 74: Op. 71 Nos. 1 and 2 and Op. 74 No. 1 on Vanguard VRS-1041 and VSD-2033 (stereo); Op. 71 No. 3, Op. 74 No. 2 and the best-known Op. 74 No. 3 on 1042 and 2034. The three of Op. 74 are delightful examples of the Haydn operation; of Op. 71, Nos. 2 and 3 also are engaging works, but No. 1 is less interesting. The Griller Quartet plays them competently, but without the excitingly enlivening rhythm and phrasing of the Schneider Quartet's performances of some of the other Haydn quartets. Though the stereo versions give fuller and warmer sound, they don't make the first violin's tone less dry.

The Quintets in C and G of Haydn's brother Michael – played by the Roth Quartet on Contemporary M-1005 – let us hear the mere exercise of technical competence of the period, as against the incandescent use of such competence by genius in the quartets of Joseph Haydn's Op. 74.

Among other records of chamber music are Epic LC-3602 and BC-1034 (stereo, which gives better-quality sound, as may be assumed hereafter concerning stereo versions that I mention), with the fine Mozart Violin Sonatas K. 301, 304 and 378 and the less interesting K. 376. Haskil plays with less energy than Grumiaux; and I suggest instead the Heksch-de Klijn performances of the first three sonatas and the fine K. 379 on Epic LC-3034. A work that Mozart regarded highly, but which I don't find very interesting, the Quintet K. 452 for piano and winds, is performed beautifully on Capitol G-7175 by Colin Horsley and winds who include the great horn-player Dennis Brain; but the reverse side has the boring Trio Op. 44 for piano, violin and horn by the English composer Lennox Berkeley; and I suggest instead the Vienna Octet performance on London LL-1609 and CS-6109 (stereo), which is coupled with the engaging Mozart Trio K. 498 for piano, viola and clarinet.

The drop from an imposing *forte* to a dainty *pianissimo* instead of the requested *piano*, in the ninth measure of the first movement of Schubert's Trio Op. 99; the unrequested drop in tempo in the section following the second subject – these are two of the details that make the Oistrakh-Knushevitzky-Oborin performance on Angel 35713 unsatisfying for me, and cause me to suggest instead the ones Casals recorded with Thibaud and Cortot (Angel COLH-12) and with Schneider and Istomin (Columbia ML-4715). And the gifted Hephzibah Menuhin's miniature playing results in a small-scale performance of Schubert's *Trout* with members of the Amadeus Quartet, on Angel 35777, which is less effective than the Amsterdam Quintet's on Epic LC-3046.

I Musici does some of its superb playing on Epic LC-3587 and BC-1029 (stereo) in four engaging pieces by Locatelli – his Concerti Grossi Op. 1 Nos. 8, 9, 11 and 12; and on Epic LC-3591 and BC-1030 (stereo) in three of Handel's best instrumental works, his Con-

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certi Grossi Op. 6 Nos. 4, 9 and 10. And Szymon Goldberg leads the Netherlands Chamber Orchestra in excellent performances of Bach's Brandenburg Concertos: Nos. 2 and 3, two of the best, with No. 1 on Epic LC-3604; the charming No. 4 with Nos. 5 and 6 on Epic LC-3605.

Of Handel's First Book of Suites for harpischord, Nos. 1, 5, 7 and 8 on Vanguard BG-593 and BGS-5021 (stereo) and No. 6 on 592 and 5020 are fine pieces, and Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are less impressive. All are played superbly – with enlivening rhythm, inflection and variety of tone – by Anton Heiller.

Investigating a number of previously issued stereophonic versions of recordings, I found that most of them gave finer-quality sound than the monophonic versions. I will list these next time; but right now I think it advisable to mention the few stereophonic versions to avoid: Angel S-3579, with Tchaikovsky's *Sleeping Beauty*, and Capitol SG-7168, with Beethoven's Mass in C, because of occasional high-frequency distortion; Vanguard BGS-5002/3, with madrigals of Morley and Wilbye, because of distorted sound; London CS-6013, with Debussy's *Images*, because of poor balance which makes the orchestral texture less clear than in the monophonic version; Columbia M2S-601, with Mahler's Symphony No. 2, and Vanguard BGS-5016/8, with Vivaldi's *L'Estro Armonico*, because the drier and less reverberant sound of the monophonic versions is more accurate. B. H. HAGGIN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Education for Whom?

Sirs:

It is, I suppose, uncharitably academic of me, in view of the grand fashion in which Mr. Christopher Jencks dismisses "Faculty Club pundits" and other carping proponents of the liberal arts, to point out that he might best have learned what a syllogism is before undertaking to argue in this form in his review of James B. Conant's *The Child, The Parent, and the State* (November 9). As one of that army of critics characterized, he informs me, by "plodding ignorance and ability to ignore reality," I must confess that I took his "syllogisms" to be parodies until I ran smack into the bald statement that "with such logic one can hardly quarrel."

Perhaps not, but only on the grounds that it isn't logic at all. Outdoing his subject's bland willingness to proceed on the basis of undemonstrated assumptions, he introduces as a "first minor premise" the grand assumption on which Conant's defense of the cafeteria high school is based: that "in typical American schools" (an animal which, for the record, Mr. Conant urgently asserts does not exist) "with typical teachers, only about one child in six can handle advanced math, physics, chemistry, and foreign languages." Ignoring the question of whether, if this be true, the schools or the children are at fault in this rather incredible situation, where 85 percent of American children are assumed to be uneducable in moderately serious intellectual matters, one would expect from a scientist some very clear objective evidence that this is the situation. Readers of *The American High School Today* will remember that the evidence, which is not further elaborated in the new book, was one paragraph stating that this was the impression he got from talking to teachers.

Perhaps this is one of those matters which, Mr. Jencks assures us, was settled by 1929, but I would like a little clearer proof. I'm afraid the trouble lies in Mr. Conant's startling admission, quoted with apparent approval by the reviewer, that in any discussion of the meaning of education "a sense of distasteful weariness overtakes me." Until we are certain what we want from our schools, it is hardly the easy task Mr. Jencks supposes to pick out those which are doing a good job or to select distinguished models. Logic – obviously not Mr. Jencks' specialty – would suggest that it is impossible. At the Council for Basic Education we begin by assuming that the primary function of the schools is intellectual training. If we are wrong, along with a good many others of those critics whom Mr. Jencks dismisses as pursuing irrelevancies, it is not from being mushy-minded, or from ignorant

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UNITY FOR HUMANITY wishes to bring to your attention Brock Chisholm's article, "Reduction of International Tensions," September (1959) issue *BULLETIN of the Atomic Scientists.*
C. C. Wilson, Director Danville, Illinois

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divorce from reality or from ennui over the prospect of having to decide what we really mean by education.

Thomas A. Bledsoe, Director
Council for Basic Education
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Jencks replies:

Why Mr. Bledsoe thought that my account of Dr. Conant's "logic" was supposed to be a syllogism I cannot say, and I hasten to agree with him that as a syllogism it would be deficient. But there is more than one kind of "logic," as Mr. Bledsoe must know. One "logic" tells a Platonic idealist such as Mr. Bledsoe that you cannot have good schools until you "define the meaning of education." Another "logic" tells an Aristotelian empiricist such as Dr. Conant that you cannot discuss "the meaning of education" until you have found good schools which exemplify what you are talking about. Still another "logic" tells me that we cannot afford to put off improving our schools until Mr. Bledsoe and his fellow Platonists finish the debate they began almost 25 centuries ago about "the meaning of education."

Perhaps more serious than "logic" is Mr. Bledsoe's question about the proportion of students who should be studying science, mathematics, and foreign languages. Certainly Dr. Conant's 15 percent is not a magic number. I know schools in which the cultural background and ambitions of the students would justify requiring such studies of 90 percent of the students.

Yet in a broad sample of the population, 15 percent is probably a reasonable estimate of the proportion who ought to master foreign languages and the natural sciences. In California, for example, the University excludes seven high school graduates out of eight, and is able to offer the remaining elite a traditional academic program. The state colleges can exclude only about half of the high school graduates, and these colleges have been able to teach foreign languages, science and mathematics to only a handful. If the majority lack the ability to master such disciplines in college, what chance do they have of profiting from them in high school?

Christopher Jencks
San Francisco, California



The New Republic's paid circulation has increased in the past eight weeks by more than 25 percent. It is not yet 100,000. But it could easily be 50,000 by January 1 with the help of our subscribers. Many have written to say how pleased they are by the new type and design, by Mr. Costello's study of Nixon, TRB's weekly report from Washington, Frank Getlein's sensible talk about art, Gerald W. Johnson's jabs at humbug, Robert Brustein's brilliant comments on the drama, or B. H. Haggin's reviews of recordings. If *you* like *The New Republic*, think of what so many others are missing that *you* can supply them for 1960.

USE THE ORDER BLANK BOUND INSIDE

Christians and Desegregation

Sirs:

I find it rather distasteful to enter into a public discussion of the comparative merits of Protestantism and Catholicism regarding any matter, much less regarding "race," but since Mr. Frank B. Pesci asked me (November 16) a number of questions, I cannot avoid comment. My assignment was to discuss a number of books that dealt with "Southern Protestants and Desegregation" since 1954. Neither the Catholic Church nor events prior to 1954 were under consideration. Mr. Pesci wants to know about the Presbyterian Synod of Virginia. Shortly after the ruling of the Supreme Court in 1954 that Synod sent an official delegation to the Governor of Virginia to make plain our belief that compulsory segregation is contrary to the laws of both God and man. This was the only denomination in Virginia which officially waited on the Governor. If Mr. Pesci can give me a date when the Catholic Bishop in Richmond waited on the Governor in the name of his church, officially and publicly to make plain the teaching of his church on this subject, I would be grateful.

Francis P. Miller
Charlottesville, Va.

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